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Detection Firm Finds 82% of Herbal Remedy Books on Amazon 'Likely Written' By AI

1 month 2 weeks ago
An anonymous reader shares a report: With gingko "memory-boost tinctures," fennel "tummy-soothing syrups" and "citrus-immune gummies," AI "slop" has come for herbalism, a study published by a leading AI-detection company has found. Originality.ai, which offers its tools to universities and businesses, says it scanned 558 titles published in Amazon's herbal remedies subcategory between January and September this year, and found 82% of the books "were likely written" by AI. "This is a damning revelation of the sheer scope of unlabelled, unverified, unchecked, likely AI content that has completely invaded [Amazon's] platform," wrote Michael Fraiman, author of the study. "There's a huge amount of herbal research out there right now that's absolutely rubbish," said Sue Sprung, a medical herbalist in Liverpool. "AI won't know how to sift through all the dross, all the rubbish, that's of absolutely no consequence. It would lead people astray."

Read more of this story at Slashdot.

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Gboard's Latest Update Removes the Period and Comma Keys on Android

1 month 2 weeks ago
An anonymous reader writes: Gboard has introduced some significant changes to the app over the past few weeks, making typing on the app much easier than ever before. You can now resize the keyboard to your desired size, and there's even something in the works that will make adding apostrophes to your text even more seamless. If all of that wasn't enough, the app is now introducing a feature that some will find peculiar, which will allow users to remove the period and common punctuation keys from Gboard. This news comes to us from 9to5Google, sharing that this is now an option with the latest version of the app.

Read more of this story at Slashdot.

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VMScape: Cracking VM-Host Isolation in the Speculative Execution Age & How Linux Patches Respond

1 month 2 weeks ago
by George Whittaker Introduction

In the world of modern CPUs, speculative execution, where a processor guesses ahead on branches and executes instructions before the actual code path is confirmed, has long been recognized as a performance booster. However, it has also given rise to a class of vulnerabilities collectively known as “Spectre” attacks, where microarchitectural side states (such as the branch target buffer, caches, or predictor state) are mis-exploited to leak sensitive data.

Now, a new attack variant, dubbed VMScape, exposes a previously under-appreciated weakness: the isolation between a guest virtual machine and its host (or hypervisor) in the branch predictor domain. In simpler terms: a malicious VM can influence the CPU’s branch predictor in such a way that when control returns to the host, secrets in the host or hypervisor can be exposed. This has major implications for cloud security, virtualization environments, and kernel/hypervisor protections.

In this article we’ll walk through how VMScape works, the CPUs and environments it affects, how the Linux kernel and hypervisors are mitigating it, and what users, cloud operators and admins should know (and do).

What VMScape Is & Why It Matters The Basics of Speculative Side-Channels

Speculative execution vulnerabilities like Spectre exploit the gap between architectural state (what the software sees as completed instructions) and microarchitectural state (what the CPU has done internally, such as cache loads, branch predictor updates, etc). Even when speculative paths are rolled back architecturally, side-effects in the microarchitecture can remain and be probed by attackers.

One of the original variants, Spectre-BTI (Branch Target Injection, also called Spectre v2) leveraged the Branch Target Buffer (BTB) / predictor to redirect speculative execution along attacker-controlled paths. Over time, hardware and software mitigations (IBRS, eIBRS, IBPB, STIBP) have been introduced. But VMScape shows that when virtualization enters the picture, the isolation assumptions break down.

VMScape: Guest to Host via Branch Predictor

VMScape (tracked as CVE‑2025‑40300) is described by researchers from ETH Zürich as “the first Spectre-based end-to-end exploit in which a malicious guest VM can leak arbitrary sensitive information from the host domain/hypervisor, without requiring host code modifications and in default configuration.”

Here are the key elements making VMScape significant:

  • The attack is cross-virtualization: a guest VM influences the host’s branch predictor state (not just within the guest).

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George Whittaker